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The ‘Shadow of Succession’ -  
A Non-Parametric Matching Approach1 
Sandra Diwisch*+, Peter Voithofer** and Christoph R. Weiss* 
 
Abstract: 
The paper analyses the relationship between succession and firm performance. Applying a 
non-parametric matching approach on a panel of roughly 4,000 Austrian family firms we 
evaluate the impact of past succession as well as future succession plans on employment 
growth. Analysing succession plans, we do not find a ‘shadow of succession’ effect. No 
significant difference in employment growth is found between firms that plan to transfer the 
firm in the next ten years and those who do not. In contrast, past succession exerts a 
significant and positive employment growth effect which becomes stronger over time. Thus, 
our findings provide support for the existence of a positive employment shadow after a 
transfer, whereas the shadow of succession hypothesis has to be rejected prior to transition.  
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1. Introduction 
Most firms in the world are family firms.2 In recent years, family firms have received 
growing attention in different fields of economics: literature on entrepreneurship focuses on 
the decision to enter into family businesses, labour market economists investigate the 
entrepreneurs’ decisions to retire and, from the perspective of the corporate governance 
literature, family firms allow economists to study the patterns of separation of ownership and 
control. The focus of our investigation is on one particular aspect of family firms: the issue of 
family succession. The circumstances of family succession are of great importance not only 
for the family members directly involved but also (per definition) for the long-run survival 
and success of family firms. In an extensive review of the existing research Handler (1994) 
finds: ‘researchers in the field of family business agree that succession is the most important 
issue that most family firms face’ (p. 133).3  
Empirical studies indicate that the importance of family firms and family succession 
differs between economies as well as between different sectors within an economy. By 
studying occupations of different family members (grandfathers, fathers and sons), Laband 
and Lentz (1983) find that occupational inheritance is particularly strong among farmers and 
to a lesser extent among other groups such as lawyers and self-employed proprietors. A large 
share of the existing empirical literature focuses on succession in the farm sector, little 
empirical work has been devoted to succession in the non-farm sector.  
The purpose of this paper is to analyse succession in small and medium sized Austrian 
manufacturing companies of which about 90% are family businesses. More specifically, we 
focus on the relationship between succession and firm performance. First, we evaluate 
empirically whether there is a significant difference in employment growth between two 
groups of firms: firms where succession has taken place during the last few years and 
otherwise identical firms that did not experience succession. Secondly, we investigate 
whether future succession plans cast their shadows on firm performance even before the 
transfer actually takes place. This ‘shadow of succession’ effect was suggested by Kimhi et al. 
(1995) who argue that the occurrence of succession within the family in the near future might 
                                                 
2 Gersick et al. (1997) report that family firms account for 65-80% of all worldwide business, and for about 40% 
of the Fortune 500 companies. Although many family firms are small, in aggregate they represent about half of 
the U.S. gross domestic product (Aronoff et al. 1997) and employ more than 80% of the work force (Neuberg 
and Lank, 1998).  
3 Succession is so central that Ward (1987) chooses to define family firms in terms of the potential for 
succession: ‘we define a family business as one that will be passed on for the family’s next generation to manage 
and control’ (p. 252). 
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motivate entrepreneurs to invest and raise current firm size. This link between succession 
considerations and firm performance might become stronger the closer the event of 
succession comes 4. Research questions of special interest are: Is there a significant difference 
in employment growth between family businesses that plan succession in the near future (or 
that have been transferred recently) and family businesses without any such succession event? 
And if so, how long is the ‘shadow of succession’, i.e., how many years before and after the 
transfer of the firm can we observe a significant difference?  
Various studies in agricultural economics deal with corporate performance prior to 
succession (Potter and Lobley, 1992; Kimhi et al., 1995; Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000) and 
following a farm transfer (Perrier-Cornet et al., 1991; Weiss, 1999; Kimhi et al., 1995). 
Empirical work on the consequences of succession in the non-farm sector typically compares 
the corporate performance of firms that were handed down to a family member to firms that 
were transferred to a family outsider (Smith and Amoako-Adu, 1999 and Perez-Gonzalez, 
2002). Moreover, a series of empirical papers investigate the performance of family firms 
based on different CEO status, i.e. founder controlled, descendant controlled and family 
outsider controlled and hence provide some indirect evidence on the performance of firms that 
were handed down to a family member (Morck et al., 1998; McConaughy, 1998; Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003; Sraer and Thesmar, 2004). The results found lead to a number of stylized 
facts. First, there is rather a negative than a positive link between succession and preceding 
corporate performance. Expecting succession in the future, firm owners deter long term 
decisions and tend to invest less. Second, succession in the farm sector leads to significant 
increases in ensuing farm growth. Moreover, firms that appoint a family successor show 
significant decreases in the operating performance relative to firms that appoint unrelated 
CEOs. Finally, with one exemption, descendant controlled firms are found to perform worse 
than founder controlled firms5.  
                                                 
4 Kimhi et al. (1995) allude in their work to Griliches and Regev (1995) who analyse firm exits and find firms 
that will exit in the future to have significantly lower growth rates in the years before exit compared to surviving 
firms and call this phenomenon the “shadow of death”. Recent empirical evidence on this issue is provided by 
Almus (2004). 
5 Referring to the above mentioned literature, Adams et al. (2003) point out that one should be cautious in 
drawing conclusions from the reported correlation between inherited control and performance on the 
management abilities of heirs. They show that performance is negatively related to the likelihood that founders 
retain the CEO title. Founder CEOs are observed to step down after periods of good performance. Thus, the 
authors conclude that ‘if performance is mean reverting and founders leave at its peak, one should observe a 
decline in performance when founders transfer control to their heirs even when inherited control is not bad for 
performance’ (p.17).  
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A clear drawback of most studies mentioned is that they only provide indirect 
evidence on the link between succession and performance as they are cross-sectional studies 
comparing the relative performance of family successors to other CEOs and not analysing the 
effects of successions per se. The present study pursues a different approach. Using a ten-year 
panel and analysing performance changes over time, direct evidence on the consequences of 
succession is derived. Also, earlier studies in the farm sector have been criticised on the 
grounds that they compare recently transferred companies with those that did not experience 
succession without controlling for differences in both groups relating to important firm 
characteristics (firm size, generational level, company’s age, region, industry). These factors 
may influence the probability of a succession event and hence the propensity to grow.6 Thus, 
we apply a non-parametric matching approach in the empirical analysis. This approach 
permits one to find a ‘continuation firm’ for every ‘succession firm’ that does not differ in 
important characteristics at the date of succession (or succession planning).  
Our results indicate no significant difference in employment growth between the 
group of firms that plan succession in the near future and otherwise identical firms without 
succession plans. In contrast, past succession exerts a significant and positive employment 
growth effect which becomes stronger over time. Thus, our findings suggest that a “shadow of 
succession effect” after a business transfer exists. 
 
2. Data  
Our analysis is based on a ten-year panel (1995-2004) of more than 4,000 Austrian 
small and medium-sized manufacturing companies, of which about 90% are family firms. The 
data is provided by the Austrian Institute for SME Research which is the largest research 
institute in Austria focusing on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The institute 
annually collects extensive information on the employment development of roughly 4,500 
manufacturing companies. In 1999, 2002 and 2005 the survey includes information on the 
firm owner’s succession plans.7 In particular, business owners were asked to report on two 
aspects of succession. First, they indicate whether they plan to transfer the firm within the 
following 10 years, and second, they report whether the firm has been handed over to them 
                                                 
6 Empirical evidence on the probability of succession is provided by Stiglbauer and Weiss 2000 and Glauben et 
al. 2002. 
7 The extended surveys with the relevant succession information were conducted in 1999, 2002 and 2005 but the 
gathered information refers to the years 1998, 2001 and 2004. For reasons of simplicity we decided to refer to 
the former as the relevant dates of interest. 
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during the last 3 years. Succession plans of roughly 4,000 entrepreneurs are available from 
each survey. In 1999 about 39% of the respondents indicate that they plan to transfer the firm 
within the next 10 years. In the same year, about 12% of the respondents report that their firm 
has been handed over to them within the last three years. Apart from the succession 
information, the survey conducted in 2005 also covers several firm characteristics such as 
firm age, the firm owner’s age and the number of ownership changes since the foundation of 
the firm. 
In the following, succession data from the 1999 survey is used to analyse the 
relationship between succession and employment growth in the time period from 1996 to 
2004. Not all of the nearly 4,000 firm observations enter the empirical analysis. Further 
restrictions with respect to the employment figures and the firm characteristics are necessary 
to obtain the final dataset. First, the dataset does not contain a complete record on the 
employment development of all firm observations over the entire period. To guarantee that 
only a minimum of observations is lost, we use three-year employment averages covering the 
periods from 1996 to 1998, from 1999 to 2001 and from 2002 to 2004. Each firm, of which at 
least one observation over the relevant three years is available, is considered in that variable. 
This procedure is also consistent with the questionnaire asking for realised successions within 
the past three years. Also, it assures that short-run cyclical fluctuations are removed. Second, 
observations with missing values for firm characteristics are excluded. Moreover, further 
adjustments pertaining to the variable “number of ownership changes” are necessary as this 
variable refers to the year 2005. Seeking for factors affecting the propensity of realised 
(planned) succession in the period from 1996 to 1998, we adjust this variable downward in 
each case where firm owners reported successions in the 1999 and 2002 surveys respectively. 
Then, we create four generation dummies for management ownership in the first, second, 
third, fourth or even earlier generation which can be seen as a good approximate for the 
generational level of firms prior to succession. The variable firm owner’s age is not 
considered for the empirical analysis since it reflects, for the group of firms that experienced 
succession, the successor’s and not the predecessor’s age. Finally, outliers are removed.  
Given that our succession variables cover a different number of observations our 
adjustments yield two final datasets. The first one includes the variable ‘planned succession’ 
and covers 1,101 observations, 440 of which reporting succession plans in the upcoming ten 
years. The second dataset includes the variable ‘realised succession’ and contains 1,093 
observations, 136 of which reporting a business succession between 1996 and 1998. 
Descriptive statistics of all variables used in the empirical analysis are shown, separately for 
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both datasets, in Table A.1 in the appendix. To ease the following methodological discussion, 
companies that experienced succession in the past and/or plan a succession in the future are 
simply denoted by ‘succession firms’ whereas companies without any such succession event 
are denoted by ‘continuation firms’. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1 The Evaluation Problem 
Columns 1 and 2 (4 and 5) of Table 1 show that prior to the empirical analysis 
significant differences in the means of several firm characteristics between recently 
transferred firms (firms with future succession plans) and their potential controls exist. This 
concerns the company’s size, the generational level, the industry orientation and the regional 
origin of the firm and indicates that succession firms are special and selective ones. 
Consequently, a comparison of the employment growth rates at this point in time would lead 
to biased results. To establish whether firm performance is due to succession or to systematic 
differences in firm characteristics at the date of succession (succession planning), we need to 
isolate the causal effect of succession on firm performance.  
 The matching method is a non-parametric approach to evaluate this causal or treatment 
effect and goes back to Rubin (1974). The aim is to select sufficient observable factors so that 
any two firms with the same value of these factors will display no systematic difference in 
their reaction to the occurrence of succession. Consequently, if each succession firm can be 
matched with a continuation firm with the same matching variables, the impact on companies 
of that type can be measured. More precisely, denote by { }1,0, ∈tiSUCC  the scenario that firm 
i experienced succession8 at the beginning of period t showing an employment level of 1,tiY  in 
period t, and an employment level of 1 1, +tiY  in the period following succession. Then, 
1
iYΔ constitutes employment growth if firm i experienced succession and similarly 0iYΔ  
represents employment growth if firm i were not transferred at the beginning of t. The effect 
of SUCC (the ‘treatment’) is formally denoted as average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT), which gives the difference in the employment change, had the transferred company 
not been transferred:   
 
                                                 
8 We restrict the following demonstration to the case where the firm experienced succession in the past. The case 
where the firm owner plans a succession in the upcoming years can be constructed similarly.  
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Table 1 
Mean comparison of selected variables 
   Realised Succession  Planned Succession 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable Treatments 
Potential 
Controls 
Selected 
Controls Treatments 
Potential 
Controls  
Selected 
Controls
ln(size9698) 2.664 2.380 2.707 2.491 2.352 2.485
First Generation 0.669 0.410 0.688 0.473 0.431 0.467
Second generation 0.191 0.365 0.182 0.327 0.339 0.312
Third generation 0.103 0.098 0.091 0.100 0.103 0.117
Fourth or earlier generation 0.037 0.127 0.038 0.100 0.127 0.104
Age of the company 50.500 48.646 46.568 48.714 47.918 49.382
Burgenland 0.066 0.063 0.076 0.057 0.064 0.054
Carinthia 0.073 0.092 0.065 0.084 0.092 0.082
Lower Austria 0.213 0.217 0.182 0.255 0.198 0.258
Upper Austria 0.199 0.173 0.231 0.184 0.169 0.189
Salzburg 0.015 0.008 0.016 0.011 0.006 0.011
Styria 0.176 0.139 0.169 0.123 0.156 0.131
Tyrol 0.081 0.073 0.100 0.045 0.095 0.037
Vorarlberg 0.096 0.090 0.090 0.077 0.098 0.084
Vienna 0.081 0.144 0.071 0.164 0.121 0.154
Production oriented 0.728 0.691 0.732 0.657 0.714 0.661
Service oriented  0.272 0.309 0.268 0.343 0.286 0.339
Unbounded propensity 
score -0.934 / -0.935 -0.203 / -0.204
Number of observations 136 957 136 440 661 440
Notes: Bold numbers indicate significantly different means between observation from the treatment group and 
from the potential or selected control group in a t-test for equality of means at the 5% level. 
 
    ( ) [ ] [ ]111 ,0,1,01 =Δ−=Δ==Δ−Δ= tiitiitiii SUCCYESUCCYESUCCYYEATT           (1) 
As the counterfactual, i.e. 0iYΔ , given that 1, =tiSUCC  is per definition not observable, the 
methodological issue is to derive a proper substitute for it. The solution advanced by 
matching is based on the assumption that given a set of observable covariates X, potential 
(non-treatment) outcomes are independent of the participation status (conditional 
independence assumption-CIA) (Rubin, 1977): 
XSUCCY tii ,
0 ⊥Δ                                                           (2) 
Hence, after adjusting for observable differences, the mean of the potential outcome is the 
same for those experiencing succession as for those not experiencing succession. This permits 
the use of matched non-transferred firms to measure how the group of firms with succession 
in the past would have grown, had they not been transferred. However, this is only valid if it 
is guaranteed that all treated firms have a counterpart in the non-treated population (common 
support condition): 
  ( ) 11Pr , <= XSUCC ti                                 (3) 
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Anyhow, matching on all variables X becomes unpractical as the number of covariates 
increases. Solving this dimensionality problem, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propose 
propensity score matching, the propensity score being defined as the probability of succession 
for firm i given a set ixX =  of firm characteristics ( ) ( )iti xXSUCCXp ==≡ 1Pr , . They 
show that if the conditions in equations (2) and (3) are fulfilled it is sufficient to control for  
( )Xp  instead of X to ensure statistical independence between potential outcome and the 
occurrence of succession.  
 In our analysis, the propensity scores are derived from two single equation probit 
models (Maddala, 1983) where the information on succession serves as endogenous variable:  
         [ ] ( ) ( )β'1Pr iiiii xxXJSUCCxXJSUCCE Φ==== =        RPJ ,=  and Ni ,...1=     (4) 
JSUCCi = (PSUCCi , RSUCCi) is our decision variable for planned succession and realised 
succession. PSUCC is set equal to 1 in cases where entrepreneur i plans to hand over the firm 
within the next 10 years and is 0 otherwise. Similarly, RSUCC is set equal to 1 where a 
succession has taken place within the last 3 years and is 0 otherwise. The controls ( ixX = ) 
consist of those firm specific and industry-specific variables that have been found as 
important determinants of succession in literature. These variables include the company’s size 
at the date of succession, the age of the company and dummies for the generational level, the 
regional origin and industry orientation. ( )•Φ  is the cumulative density function of the 
standard normal and β  is the parameter vector to be estimated. 
 
3.2 Matching Estimators 
 The estimated propensity scores are then used to construct the comparison groups. A 
variety of different propensity score matching schemes are possible.9 Each scheme involves 
the definition of a criterion of proximity and the selection of appropriate weights to associate 
the selected set of controls with each succession firm. For instance, the neighbourhood may 
range from a singleton set (one-to-one matching: nearest neighbour or within calliper) to a 
multiple set, eventually including all control observations (n-nearest neighbours, radius 
matching, stratification, kernel and local linear regression-based matching). The choice 
generally relies on the trade-off between bias and variance associated with each type of 
matching scheme. Generally, increasing the neighbourhood to construct the comparison group 
                                                 
9 See Heckman et al. (1997), Smith and Todd (2005) and Becker and Ichino (2002) for a detailed description of 
each of these matching estimators. 
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will reduce the variance (resulting from using more information to construct the 
counterfactual for each succession firm) and increase the bias (resulting from using on 
average more, but poorer matches).  
 Having defined the neighbourhood, the next issue is that of attaching appropriate 
weights to their members. The most common weighting schemes involve setting unity (equal) 
weight(s) to the nearest observation(s) and zero to the others, and kernel weights that are 
proportional to the closeness of the propensity scores of treated and controls.   
In our application we implement multiple nearest neighbours matching. Given that 
both potential control groups are rather large, the use of more than one nearest neighbour is 
appropriate. For this purpose, define a neighbourhood ( )iPC  for each firm i in the set of 
succession firms 1SUCC . Neighbours for i are continuation firms oSUCCj∈  for which 
( )ij PCP ∈ . The firms matched to i are those firms in set iA  where 
{ ( )}iji PCPSUCCjA ∈∈= 0 . Nearest neighbour matching sets:  
                                     ( ) jiji PPPC −= min                  0SUCCj∈                                 (5) 
In case of multiple nearest neighbour matching iA  is a set of k closest firms to firm i where 
each of these k neighbours receives equal weight in constructing the counterfactual mean, that 
is, the weights ( )jiW ,1  equal 1/k  if iAj∈  and equals 0 otherwise. We focus on the case 
where k = 5 and match with replacement which allows a given continuation firm to get 
matched to more than one succession firm10. Since there is no consensus in the literature on 
the best matching estimator to adopt, we compare our main results from 5-nearest neighbour 
matching with the ones obtained from one-to-one nearest neighbour matching, kernel 
matching and radius matching, the latter two applying kernel weights.  
 
3.3 Matching Results 
 The analysis starts with the estimation of the probit models. Table A.2 in the appendix 
contains the results of both models. Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests on normality and 
heteroscedasticity have been carried out to find potential misspecifications that would lead to 
inconsistent parameter estimates (Verbeek, 2000). In both specifications the normality 
                                                 
10 Matching with replacement also involves a trade-off between bias and variance. Allowing for replacement 
increases the average quality of the matches, but reduces the number of distinct continuation firm observations 
used to construct the counterfactual for each succession firm, thereby increasing the variance of the estimator. 
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assumption can not be rejected at the 5% level of significance. But it turns out that the 
variable company’s age is a potential source of heteroscedasticity in both models. We tried to 
incorporate this by estimating heteroscedastic probit models but given that the estimation 
results were rather unsatisfactory, we finally returned to the almost correctly specified 
homoscedastic probit models. 
The estimated models are statistically significant at the 1% level or better, as measured 
by the likelihood ratio test. However, it is also evident from Table A.2 that both models differ 
considerably in their explanatory power. The first model, estimating the probability of 
succession in the past, correctly classifies 87.37% of all observations. The results are not 
discussed here in detail. Over all they suggest that the probability of succession is 
significantly influenced by a number of firm characteristics, including the company’s size and 
age, the generational level and the regional origin. In contrast, the explanatory power of the 
second model which estimates the probability of having succession plans is rather low. It 
correctly classifies only 60.94% of all observations. Also, a large portion of the variance in 
the data can not be explained in this econometric model, as indicated by the relatively low R-
squared of 3%. Anyhow, the model is able to identify some firm characteristics that influence 
the decision whether firm owners plan succession or not. So we finally decided to apply the 
matching procedure on both datasets.   
Matching11 is regarded as successful if the means of the relevant variables do not 
differ significantly between the treatment group and the control group after the matching 
procedure. Columns 1 and 3 (4 and 6) of Table 1 show the means of several firm 
characteristics between recently transferred firms (firms with future succession plans) and 
their matched counterparts. The differences are small and not statistically significant at the 
5% level as indicated by a t-test. Moreover, the means of the unbounded propensity scores, 
which can be seen as a summary measure of various variables, do not differ significantly 
across these groups, indicating a good fit of the matching procedure applied.  
 The effect of succession on employment development is evaluated by comparing the 
employment growth rates: 
  =Δ +P ittY ,,1 ln(employmentt+1) – ln(employmentt)       }{ 1,0∈∀P                       (6) 
                                                 
11 We use the unbounded βˆ'ix  rather than the bounded propensity score ( )βˆ'ixΦ  because of his preferable 
distribution properties (Hujer et al., 1997). 
11 
between succession firms and their matched counterparts, that is 1iYΔ  and 0iYΔ . The growth 
rates are calculated using three-year averages as well as annual data. The unbiased estimator 
for the causal effect ATT is then the mean difference of the average employment growth rates 
in these groups: 
   ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ Δ−Δ= ∑ ∑
= =
1 1
1 1
01
1
1 1 N
i
N
i
ii YYN
ATT          (7) 
A positive (negative) effect of succession on employment growth is indicated if ATT1 is 
statistically significant in a t-test. Contrary, an insignificant test points to the absence of a 
‘shadow of succession effect’. 
 Table 2 gives the results. It shows the development of the employment growth rates 
for both treatment groups, realised succession and planned succession, and their matched 
counterparts. The comparison starts with the average three-year growth rates and continues 
with detailed results for each year. Analysing succession plans, we do not find an impact on 
employment growth. The causal effect is considerably small and not statistical significant. 
This holds for both the short-time and the medium–time period and is also confirmed by the 
annual results. Thus, no significant relationship between future succession plans and 
employment growth is found. This may have two reasons. First, succession plans could be 
very vague due to the long planning horizon of ten years. This reduces the liability of the 
answers and increases the probability of an intention-behaviour discrepancy.12 Second, one 
could also reject our hypothesis that future succession plans cast their shadows on firm 
performance.  
 In contrast to succession plans, realised succession in the past is found to have a 
significant and positive impact on employment growth for the 02049698−  time period. While 
firms without succession in the past realise a negative growth rate of about twelve percent 
over this period, succession firms grow about three percent. The difference, i.e. the causal 
effect amounts to about 15 percentage points and is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
This suggests that employment growth is 15 percentage points larger for firms that 
experienced succession in the past compared to firms that reported no succession. Given an 
average level of employment of roughly 18 employees over the 1996 to 1998 time period (see 
                                                 
12 Authors from different fields of economics (and, in particular, from economic psychology and marketing) 
have challenged the usefulness of intention measures (such as succession plans) as a predictor for actual 
behaviour. Foxall (1983), for example, argues that a high intention-behaviour correspondence should be 
expected only under strictly limited (and unrealistic) conditions. Empirical support for the intention-behaviour 
discrepancy in succession plans is provided by Väre et al. (2004). 
12 
Table 2 
Causal Effects: Firm specific Employment Growth 
Growth Rate in Firms Succession (percent) 
No succession 
(percent) 
Causal effect   
(percentage points) 
Test 
statistic  
Planned Succession       
99019698 −  430 -0.048 -0.039 -0.009 -0.66  
02049698 −  440 -0.100 -0.078 -0.021 -0.93  
999698 −  388 -0.047 -0.046 -0.002 -0.18  
009698 −  394 -0.049 -0.051 0.001 -0.02  
019698 −  401 -0.092 -0.089 -0.003 -0.17  
029698 −  396 -0.117 -0.092 -0.025 -1.06  
039698 −  398 -0.121 -0.111 -0.010 -0.40  
049698 −  437 -0.115 -0.088 -0.027 -0.97  
Realised Succession       
99019698 −  134 -0.016 -0.041 0.025 1.08  
02049698 −  136 0.026 -0.122 0.148 4.37 *** 
999698 −  120 -0.026 -0.054 0.029 1.02  
009698 −  124 -0.006 -0.039 0.034 1.15  
019698 −  125 -0.066 -0.111 0.045 1.32  
029698 −  121 -0.036 -0.142 0.106 2.82 *** 
039698 −  120 0.014 -0.110 0.125 3.38 *** 
049698 −  136 0.028 -0.143 0.171 4.23 *** 
Notes: Asterisks denote statistical significance in a t-test for equality of means at the 1% (***), 
5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 5-Nearest Neighbour Matching. 
 
Table A1), this corresponds to 3 additional new jobs per firm, revealing a considerable 
medium-run succession effect. Contrary, no such effect is found for the short-time period 
from 99019698 − , indicating that there is a consolidation time period after succession before 
employment effects are observable. Detailed results for each year give a similar picture. The 
causal effect is positive but insignificant in the years immediately after succession, but then, 
from the fourth year onward, displays a strongly significant and positive relationship between 
succession and employment growth. After some years of consolidation successors start 
expanding and hire additional employees. Since the firms do not differ in observable 
characteristics at the date of succession (see columns 4 and 6 in Table 1) two groups with 
equal pre-succession conditions are compared. Given that unobservable differences between 
both groups at the date of succession are considerably small, the reported growth effects can 
be directly attributed to the occurrence of succession. These results remain unchanged when 
alternative matching estimators are applied as documented in Table A3 in the appendix.  
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4. Conclusion 
 
 The aim of this paper was to analyse the relationship between succession and firm 
performance. Using a unique panel data set on a sample of roughly 4,000 Austrian family 
firms we evaluate empirically the impact of realised succession as well as planned succession 
on employment growth. Analysing succession plans, we do not find a ‘shadow of succession’ 
effect. No significant difference in employment growth is found between firms that plan to 
transfer the firm in the next ten years and those who do not. In contrast, past succession exerts 
a significant and positive employment growth effect which becomes stronger over time. Thus, 
our findings provide support for the existence of a positive employment shadow after a 
transfer, whereas the shadow of succession hypothesis has to be rejected prior to transition.  
Two limitations to the results have to be mentioned. First, selection bias is a 
potentially serious weakness of our analysis as we were unable to study the effects of 
succession on the probability of firm exits. The results in this paper should be seen strictly as 
an analysis of employment development inside continuing businesses. And second, the 
present analysis does not take into account that succession within the family may have 
different consequences compared to firms where the successor is not a family member. The 
fact that we focus on successions in general and do not analyse succession within and outside 
a family separately makes comparison with previous studies in this field difficult.   
 However, by analysing performance changes over time the present study provides 
direct evidence on the consequences of succession and can be seen as a major contribution to 
existing cross sectional studies on this issue. The reported positive employment effect of 
succession again underlines the importance of succession for the aggregate labour market in 
Austria. An estimated 51,500 Austrian small and medium sized enterprises will face the 
challenge of succession over the decade 2004-2013, potentially affecting 438,000 employees 
or 17% of all jobs in the Austrian industry (Mandl 2004). Therefore, the success of business 
successions is, not at least because of the effect on the labour market, of particular importance 
for the economy. Our results strongly support the notion that it is essential to raise public 
awareness of the importance of business succession as an attractive alternative to starting up 
one’s own business. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1 
Descriptive statistics 
 Realised Succession  Planned Succession 
Variable Mean/Share STDV  Mean/Share STDV 
Average Size 9698 17.507 20.691  17.350 20.309 
Average Growth Rate in      
99019698 −  -0.006 0.268  -0.005 0.263 
02049698 −  -0.021 0.393  -0.021 0.386 
999698 − * -0.002 0.290  -0.002 0.280 
009698 − * -0.002 0.297  -0.003 0.297 
019698 − * -0.030 0.335  -0.027 0.335 
029698 − * -0.040 0.368  -0.038 0.358 
039698 − * -0.028 0.416  -0.029 0.414 
049698 − * -0.006 0.520  -0.005 0.515 
Generation      
First generation 0.442 0.497  0.448 0.497 
Second generation 0.343 0.475  0.334 0.472 
Third generation 0.099 0.299  0.102 0.302 
Fourth or earlier generation 0.116 0.321  0.116 0.321 
Age of the company 48.877 33.507  48.636 33.512 
Region      
Burgenland 0.063 0.243  0.061 0.239 
Carinthia 0.090 0.286  0.089 0.285 
Lower Austria 0.217 0.412  0.221 0.415 
Upper Austria 0.177 0.381  0.175 0.380 
Salzburg 0.009 0.095  0.008 0.090 
Styria 0.144 0.351  0.143 0.350 
Tyrol 0.074 0.262  0.075 0.264 
Vorarlberg 0.091 0.287  0.090 0.286 
Vienna 0.136 0.343  0.138 0.345 
Industry      
Service oriented 0.305 0.460  0.309 0.462 
Production oriented 0.695 0.460  0.691 0.462 
Realised Succession 9698 0.124 0.330 
 - - 
Planned Succession - -  0.400 0.490 
Number of Observation (N)      1093       1101 
* The number of observations used to calculate the growth rate changes, since each 
firm, of which at least one observation over three years is available, is considered. 
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Table A2 
Results of the probit estimations 
Dependent Variable     Realised Succession       Planned Succession 
Independent Variables Coef. z-value   Coef. z-value  
ln(size9698) 0.602 2.24 ** 0.384 2.00 ** 
ln(size9698)2 -0.081 -1.65 * -0.052 -1.43  
Second generation -0.847 -6.42 *** -0.129 -1.38  
Third generation -0.619 -3.28 *** -0.238 -1.62  
Fourth or earlier generation -1.684 -5.77 *** -0.492 -2.95 *** 
Age of the company 0.009 4.76 *** 0.003 2.01 ** 
Burgenland 0.565 2.15 ** -0.193 -1.02  
Carinthia 0.223 0.91  -0.234 -1.41  
Lower Austria 0.330 1.64  -0.021 -0.16  
Upper Austria 0.429 2.10 ** -0.157 -1.14  
Salzburg 0.739 1.48  0.195 0.45  
Styria 0.480 2.29 ** -0.346 -2.37 ** 
Tyrol 0.476 1.92 * -0.645 -3.53 *** 
Vorarlberg 0.423 1.77 * -0.315 -1.87 * 
Sevice oriented -0.062 -0.52  0.207 2.41 ** 
Intercept -2.430 -6.34 *** -0.746 -2.87 *** 
Number of observations   1093   1101  
LogL -367.346  -718.932  
LR chi-squared (15)  86.49   43.78  
Prob > chi-squared  0.0002   0.0001  
Pseudo R2  0.1053   0.0296  
% Correct predictions   87.37    60.94  
Notes: The left out categories are ‘First Generation’ and ‘Vienna’. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
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Table A3 
Causal Effects using different Matching Estimators: Firm specific Employment Growth 
Growth Rate in Firms Succession (percent) 
No Succession 
(percent) 
Causal effect 
(percentage points) 
Test 
statistic   
Realised Succession       
99019698 −        
One-to-one Nearest Neighbour 134 -0.016 -0.008 -0.007 -0.21  
5-Nearest Neighbour 134 -0.016 -0.041 0.025 1.08  
Radius (radius < 0.05) 133 -0.016 -0.042 0.026 1.47  
Kernel (Gaussian Kernel) 134 -0.016 -0.040 0.025 1.46  
02049698 −        
One-to-one Nearest Neighbour 136 0.026 -0.095 0.121 2.57 ** 
5-Nearest Neighbour 136 0.026 -0.122 0.148 4.37 ***
Radius (radius < 0.05) 135 0.025 -0.106 0.131 5.16 ***
Kernel (Gaussian Kernel) 136 0.026 -0.102 0.128 5.38 ***
Planned Succession       
99019698 −        
One-to-one Nearest Neighbour 430 -0.048 -0.051 -0.003 -0.08  
5-Nearest Neighbour 430 -0.048 -0.039 -0.009 -0.66  
Radius (radius < 0.05) 430 -0.048 -0.038 -0.010 -0.75  
Kernel (Gaussian Kernel) 430 -0.048 -0.038 -0.010 -0.73  
02049698 −        
One-to-one Nearest Neighbour 437 -0.100 -0.128 0.028 0.88  
5-Nearest Neighbour 437 -0.100 -0.078 -0.021 -0.93  
Radius (radius < 0.05) 437 -0.100 -0.094 -0.005 -0.27  
Kernel (Gaussian Kernel) 437 -0.100 -0.094 -0.006 -0.29  
Notes: Asterisks denote statistical significance in a t-test for equality of means at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 
10% (*) level. 
 
 
 
